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Abstract: 
Based on the longitudinal Immigration Data Base, this research found that the post-landing
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  From the perspective of interregional disparities in economic strength and political 
representation, the trend of interprovincial population redistribution in Canada since the early 
1950s has been highly problematic.  The trend has been an increasing concentration of the Canadian 
population towards the three economically strong provinces (Ontario, British Columbia, and 
Alberta) from the remaining seven economically weak provinces (see the income levels and 
employment growth rates of the provinces in Table 1). It is unfortunate that contrary to the 
expectation of the neoclassical economic theory (Courchene, 1970), the redistribution has not led to 
the elimination of the wide economic gap between the two sets of provinces (Courchene, 1986; 
Higgins and Savoie, 1997; Liaw and Qi, 2004).
1  
  In addition to failing to eliminate the wide economic gap, the population redistribution has 
been so great and persistent
2 that it threatened the preexisting interprovincial balance in political 
power in the federal parliament.  In 1985, the Canadian constitution was amended to guarantee that 
each province be entitled to have no less seats in the House of Commons than it held in 1976, 
irrespective of any decline in its share of the national population.  Although the algorism used to 
                                                 
1 The constitution of Canada stipulates that the federal government redistribute tax revenues among 
the provinces via the Equalization Program so that residents in all provinces can receive similar 
levels of public services (APEC, 2001). The redistributed money is called equalization payment, 
which is computed based on the equalization entitlement per capita (see last column of Table 1). 
The economically weak provinces are the ones that receive equalization payment annually, whereas 
the economically strong provinces identified in this paper are the ones that usually do not receive 
any equalization payment, except for a few years of province-specific economic difficulty (e.g. the 
downturn of the economy of British Columbia following the economic crisis of Asia in the late 
1990s). The territory of Canada is divided into ten provinces and three territories.  Since the three 
territories (Yukon, Northwest Territory, and Nunavut) have had very small populations (0.3% of 
the national population), we focus on the ten provinces.    
2 According to the 1951 and 2001 population censuses, the share of the Canadian population 
increased from 1951 to 2001 by 5.2% (from 32.8% to 38.0%) for Ontario, by 4.7% (from 8.3% to 
13.0%) for British Columbia, and by 3.2% (from 6.7% to 9.9%) for Alberta. Among the losing 
provinces, the share decreased by 4.8% (from 28.9% to 24.1%) for Quebec, by 2.7% (from 5.9% to 
3.2%) for Saskatchewan, by 1.8% (from 5.5% to 3.7%) for Manitoba, and by 3.9% (from 11.6% to 
7.7%) for the set of the four least populated provinces in the Atlantic region.   3
allocate the seats according to the census counts was consequently changed to slow down the 
decline in the relative shares of the seats by the economically weaker provinces, the shift in political 
power in the House of Commons has been substantial.  From 1976 to 2004, among the three 
economically strong provinces, Ontario gained 11 seats, British Columbia gained 8 seats, and 
Alberta gained 7 seats, whereas the remaining seven economically weak provinces experienced no 
change in their numbers of seats.
3
  To a large extent, the interprovincial population redistribution was caused by the 
interprovincial migration of Canadian-born individuals.  According to an analysis of the 1996 
census data by Beaujot and Kerr (2004, p. 148), British Columbia achieved a massive net gain of 
789,500 Canadian-born lifetime migrants, resulting in a net migration rate of 21.4%.  The 
corresponding net gains of Ontario and Alberta were 242,400 (implying a net migration rate of 
2.3%) and 277,600 migrants (implying a net migration rate of 10.4%), respectively. All the 
remaining seven provinces were net losers of these migrants, with the province with the weakest 
average job creation capacity over several decades (see Table 1), namely Saskatchewan, being the 
greatest loser in terms of both net migration volume (-422,200 persons) and  net migration rate 
(-43.2%). 
  Even more important than the interprovincial migration process of the Canadian-born has 
been the initial destination choices made by immigrants: the shares of the newly landed immigrants 
by Ontario and British Columbia have substantially exceeded their respective shares of the 
Canadian population.  For example, between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003, as many as 55.2% and 
16.0% of the 199,159 new immigrants landed in these two provinces, while their shares of the 
                                                 
3 In 2004, the total number of seats in the House of Commons is 308: 7 for Newfoundland 
(abbreviated from the longer official name “Newfoundland and Labrador”), 4 for Prince Edward 
Island, 11 for Nova Scotia, 10 for New Brunswick, 75 for Quebec, 106 for Ontario, 14 for Manitoba, 
14 for Saskatchewan, 28 for Alberta, 36 for British Columbia, and 1 for each of the three territories. 
Between 1952 and 2004, Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta gained 21, 14, and 11 seats, 
respectively, whereas New Brunswick and Saskatchewan lost 1 and 3 seats, respectively. For more 
information, visit www.elections.ca.      4
national population as of July 1, 2003 were 38.4% and 13.2%, respectively.
4 From a long-term 
perspective, Beaujot and Kerr’s (2004, p. 148) analysis of the 1996 census data showed that 54.6% 
and 18.2% of the 5,037,100 foreign-born individuals in Canada resided respectively in these two 
provinces on the date of census. Our computation based on the newly released data of the 2001 
population census reveals that 55.6% and 18.5% of the 5,448,480 foreign-born individuals in 
Canada resided in Ontario and British Columbia, respectively.  Thus, the immigrants became even 
more concentrated into these two provinces from 1996 to 2001.  It is useful to point out that 
although Alberta has been a major long-term net gainer of Canadian-born interprovincial migrants, 
its share of Canada’s newly landed immigrants tends to be somewhat less than its share of the 
national population.  For example, Alberta’s share of the immigrants who landed between July 1, 
2002 and June 30, 2003 was only 6.8%, while its share of the national population in 2003 was 
10.0%.  For reference, Alberta’s share of Canada’s foreign-born residents was 8.2% in 1996 
(Beaujot and Kerr, 2004, p. 148) and 8.1% in 2001 (based on our own computation). 
  As a consequence of the prevalence of sub-replacement fertility in all provinces and the 
sharp increase in the intake of immigrants by Canada since the late 1980s, net international 
migration has not only contributed to more than 50% of Canada’s population growth but also 
become more important in accounting for the variation in the growth rates of provincial populations 
in recent years.
5  For example, between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003, provincial population 
growth rate was much greater for Ontario (1.08%) than for Quebec (0.56%), mainly because net 
immigration rate was much greater for Ontario (0.72%) than for Quebec (0.35%).
6      
  The undesirable effect of the over-concentration of the newly landed immigrants into 
                                                 
4 The information on landed immigrants was from CANSIM II, Table 051-0004 (last modified on 
July 30, 2004), whereas the information on population sizes was from CANSIM II, Table 051-0001 
(last modified on July 26, 2004). 
5 Net immigration’s contribution to Canada’s population growth is 64.5% in 2000-2001, 65.8% in 
2001-2002, 58.0% in 2002-2003, and 66.3% in 2003-2004.  
6 The data are from CANSIM II, Tables 051-0001 and 051-0004.    5
Ontario and British Columbia on interprovincial population redistribution could be alleviated if 
their post-landing migration in Canada could lead to a dispersal towards other parts of the country 
in a way similar to the widespread dispersal of relocating immigrants in the United States that 
occurred in 1995-2000 both among states and among metropolitan areas (Frey, 2004). However, an 
analysis of the 1991-96 interprovincial migration of immigrants, based on the 1996 census data, 
found that both Ontario and British Columbia were net gainers of these relocating immigrants, 
implying a further concentration towards these two provinces (SPPR, 2002, p. 20). Is this finding 
representative over a longer stretch of time? If so, does the same basic pattern hold for different 
categories of the immigrants? What might be the contextual reasons for the overall relocation of 
immigrants to be sharply different between Canada and the United States? 
  The main purpose of this paper is to gain insights into the post-landing interprovincial 
migration made by newly landed immigrants during a three year time interval after acquiring the 
landed immigrant status, based on the tabulations that were created by Statistics Canada from the 
records of a data system in which the official landing records of immigrants have been linked to 
their annual income tax records.  To see whether the impacts of the immigrants’ post-landing 
migration on interprovincial population redistribution can be rectified by changes in the 
immigration program, special attention is paid to the selectivity with respect to immigration class 
and educational attainment. To understand the fundamental difference between Canada and the 
United States, we also briefly examine the salient features of the 1995-2000 interstate migration of 
the immigrants in the United States.  Hopefully, our findings would help to provide sensible 
answers to relevant questions about post-landing migrations such as those raised in the previous 
paragraph.  We also hope that our findings would serve as useful background information for the 
design of immigration policies and for assessing the effectiveness of such policies. 
  
2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE INDICES 
  The data source for our study of the post-landing interprovincial migration of immigrants is 
a set of multidimensional tabulations created by Statistics Canada from a longitudinal data system   6
called IMDB (Immigration Data Base). The IMDB was created by linking (1) the official landing 
records of immigrants kept by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) with (2) the records of 
their annual income tax returns filed to Revenue Canada. The immigrants who landed in Canada 
since January 1, 1980, filed at least one income tax return, and were aged 15 or over in the tax year 
are kept, for only the tax filing year(s), in the IMDB, which has been updated on an ongoing basis 
with the lag times of a few years.  The tabulations used in this study cover all individuals in the 
IMDB who landed in Canada between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1995.  Note that this data 
system is incomplete in the sense that the immigrants who never filed an income tax return can not 
appear at all as an observation, and that an immigrant who filed income tax returns sporadically 
may appear, disappear, and then reappear as an observation in the data system.  We assume that this 
incompleteness is unlikely to result in a systematic bias in the main patterns of post-landing 
migration.
7  
  In these tabulations, the four Atlantic provinces (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, 
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick) have been merged into the Atlantic region so that it is 
impossible for the user to identify any specific province in the region.  Similarly, all territories have 
also been merged into one region (the North region). Thus, there are only eight geographical units 
for studying the post-landing migrations.  For simplicity, we consider these eight geographical units 
as “provinces” and the migrations among them as “interprovincial migrations”. 
  Since we found in our preliminary investigation that most of the migrations of the 
immigrants in the business and refugee classes occurred in the first few years after landing, we use 
three years as the time interval to conduct our investigation of post-landing migrations. Let x and 
x+3 be the landing year and the following tax year, respectively.  An immigrant is defined as an 
interprovincial migrant if her/his landing province in year x is different from her/his tax province in 
                                                 
7 Using the Public Use Microdata File of the 1996 census, we found that in the 1991-96 
interprovincial migration of the immigrants who landed in 1981-90, British Columbia and Ontario 
are the net gainers, whereas the Atlantic region and all remaining provinces are net losers.  Since 
this finding is consistent with our main finding from the IMDB, we believe that the incompleteness 
of the IMDB is unlikely to introduce significant bias to the big picture.    7
year x+3 (Remember that the set of four Atlantic provinces is considered as one “province” in this 
study so that a person relocating from Newfoundland to Nova Scotia is not counted as an 
interprovincial migrant).  Based on this definition, the tabulations created by Statistics Canada 
allow us to compute both in- and out-migration flows of each province but do not contain enough 
information for constructing any origin-by-destination flow matrix.  A further limitation of these 
tabulations is that neither in-migration flow nor out-migration flow can be computed for the North 
region so that we are constrained to find the net migration volume of the North region by comparing 
its number of immigrants in a landing year and its number of immigrants in the tax year three years 
later.  Since the North region contains a very small proportion of the immigrants, we will mostly 
ignore it in the discussions of our findings. 
  All the tabulations made by Statistics Canada include the dimensions of landing year and 
tax year simultaneously on an annual basis. Thus, we are able to observe a detailed temporal pattern 
of post-landing migrations for every three-year period from 1980-83 through 1981-84, 
1982-85, . . . , to 1992-95. 
           We use various descriptive indices to characterize the interprovincial in-, out-, and net 
migration of the newly landed immigrants and to show the impacts of the post-landing migration on 
their interprovincial distribution. Both volumes (in persons) and rates (in percentage) are used for 
measuring in-, out- and net migration.  For the in-migration of a given province, we compute both 
an in-migration ratio (by using the number of immigrants landed in the province as the denominator) 
and an in-migration rate (by using the number of immigrants landed in the rest of Canada as the 
denominator). The former reflects the impact of the inflow of the relocating immigrants on the 
province’s immigrant stock, whereas the latter represents the propensity of the immigrants in the 
rest of the system to move into the province in question.  For brevity, we will use only in-migration 
rate in our characterization and explanation of the in-migration process.  Since what we call 
“in-migration ratio” here is frequently called “in-migration rate” in publications that are not 
particularly concerned with measurement issues, we also provide the values of in-migration ratio 
for readers who are accustomed to using them.   8
  To assess the redistributional impacts of the post-landing migration, the interprovincial 
distributions of the immigrants at landing and three years later are also measured. Dissimilarity 
index is used to show the extent of the change in population distribution in the three-year period 
after landing. It is defined as 
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where P[ j, x] is the proportion of the immigrants choosing province j as the initial destination at 
landing and P[ j, x+3] is the proportion of the immigrants residing in province j three years after 
landing.
8 The dissimilarity index, in other words, is the percentage of the immigrants that must be 




  We found from the IMDB that there were 915,380 immigrants who got the landed 
immigrant status in 1980-92 and filed an income tax return three years after landing.  Among them, 
103,155 were found to be interprovincial migrants (i.e.  individuals whose “province” of residence 
three years after landing was different from the “province” of destination at landing), implying a 
three-year interprovincial out-migration rate of 11.3% (Panel A of Table 2).  In light of the fact that 
the 1991-96 interprovincial out-migration rate, computed from the data of the 1996 census, was 
3.2% for the Canadian-born and 3.0% for the immigrants who landed before mid-1991 (SPPR, 
2001)
9, this finding clearly indicates that within the first few years after landing, newly landed 
                                                 
8 The exact length of the time span between the time of landing (x) and the time of tax filing (x+3) 
is some what longer than 3 years, because the time of landing can be any date between January 1 
and December 31 of year x, whereas the time of the residence in year (x+3) is at the end of that year. 
Thus, the “three-year” migration internal is actually about 3.5 years in length.   
9 The geographical system used to compute the1991-1996 interprovincial migration rates has 11 
geographical units (the 10 provinces, plus the northern territories as one unit).       9
immigrants were much more likely to make long-distance migrations within Canada than were the 
Canadian-born and the immigrants who had resided in Canada for a longer stretch of time.
10  This 
finding implies that long-distance migration within Canada is an important part of the immigrants’ 
settlement and integration process. 
  The immigrants who landed in the provinces that were economically weak and had very 
small immigrant populations were hyper-mobile: the out-migration rates ranged from 17.7% for 
Quebec and 26.4% for Manitoba to 38.3% for the Atlantic region and 46.6% for Saskatchewan. The 
difference between the somewhat lower rates of Quebec and Manitoba on the one hand and the very 
high rates of the Atlantic region and Saskatchewan on the other is related to the fact that the former 
have small but well-functioning ethnic communities such as the Haitian community in Montreal
11 
and the Filipino community in Winnipeg, whereas the latter do not (SPPR, 2001). 
  Without large well-functioning new immigrant communities, the economically strong 
province of Alberta also had a rather high out-migration rate (20.0%).  This high out-migration rate 
was partly due to the fact that Alberta’s job creation capacity was substantially surpassed by that of 
Ontario in the 1980s and by that of British Columbia in the early 1990s.
12  Although the tabulations 
                                                 
10 It is useful to note that based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 1986 census, 
Newbold (1996) in his study of interprovincial migration found that for the “non-natives” (the 
Canadian-born individuals whose province of residence in 1981 was different from their province 
of birth), the 1981-86 onward and return out-migration rates were 5.6% and 7.7%, respectively. 
Onward migration was defined as a migration towards a province which was not the province of 
birth, whereas return migration was defined as a migration back to the province of birth.  The 
system used in that study contains 9 provinces as distinct geographical units, because Prince 
Edwards Island and the northern territories were assigned the same code in the PUMF and hence 
were removed from the study.  Although the differences in geographical units and time intervals 
make a strict comparison impossible, our finding suggests that if we do not ignore the re-migrations 
towards the United States or back to the country of origin, newly landed immigrants are more prone 
to re-migrating than are the non-natives in Canada.     
11 Although Montreal does have large and well-functioning Italian and Greek communities, these 
southern European countries were no longer importance sources of the new immigrants since the 
1970s.    
12 Alberta’s 1980-90 employment growth rate was 1.35% per year, compared with Ontario’s 2.18% 
per year. Alberta’s 1990-95 employment growth rate was 1.45% per year, compared with British 
Columbia’s 2.41% per year.   10
of the IMDB made by Statistics Canada can not be used to show the origin-by-destination flows of 
immigrants, it is likely that many immigrants who landed in Alberta were drawn out by Ontario and 
British Columbia. 
  With large well-developed immigrant communities and relatively strong economies, 
Ontario and British Columbia had the lowest out-migration rates: 5.0% and 9.7%, respectively. 
Since the labor market and ethnic enclaves are much larger in Ontario than in British Columbia, it is 
not surprising that the out-migration rate was lower for Ontario than for British Columbia. 
  Because the immigrants were extremely unevenly distributed at the time of landing, the 
interprovincial variation in out-migration rates did not play a major role in determining the 
interprovincial variation in out-migration flows. For example, Ontario sent out twice as many 
migrants as British Columbia did (24,055 versus 12,345), despite the fact that Ontario’s 
out-migration rate was only half of that of British Columbia.  The main determinant in this case was 
the fact that 52.1% of the immigrants landed in Ontario and 13.9% landed in British Columbia.  
Being the second most important destination at landing and having the lowest out-migration rate 
among the economically weak provinces, Quebec turned out to be the province that sent out the 
largest number of migrants (28,590). 
3.2. In-migration 
  With respect to the abilities to attract the relocating immigrants, Ontario had by far the 
highest in-migration rate (11.50%), which was computed from the fact that among the 438,235 
immigrants who landed in the rest of Canada, as many as 50,390 became residents of Ontario three 
years after landing.  With the second highest in-migration rate (3.45%), British Columbia attracted 
the second largest number of relocating immigrants (27,185).  With the third highest in-migration 
rate (1.33%), Alberta attracted the third largest number of them (11,060).  In general, unlike the 
situation of out-migration, the interprovincial variation in in-migration rates played an important 
role in determining the interprovincial variation in in-migration volumes. 
  It is worth noting that despite having some well-established immigrant communities in   11
Montreal and a much larger labor market in the province
13, Quebec was weaker than Alberta in 
attracting the relocating immigrants: Quebec’s in-migration rate (1.01%) and in-migration volume 
(7,590) were smaller than those of Alberta. Underlying this difference was Quebec’s weaker 
economy and its French milieu. 
  In addition to having the highest out-migration rate, Saskatchewan had the lowest 
in-migration rate (0.15%) and attracted only 1,360 relocating immigrants.  With a small but 
well-functioning immigrant community, Manitoba’s in-migration rate (0.24%) and in-migration 
volume (2,105) were greater than those of Saskatchewan.  Due to a coding problem
14, the 
in-migration rate (0.27%) and in-migration volume (2,390) of the Atlantic region were overstated.  
Even with this overstatement, the Atlantic region still appeared to have a very weak ability to attract 
relocating immigrants. 
  In terms of odds ratio
15, in-migration had a much greater interprovincial variation than did 
out-migration.  For example, consider the contrast between Ontario (the province with the greatest 
powers to retain and attract migrants) and Saskatchewan (the province with the weakest powers). 
Ontario’s odds of in-migration was 86.1 times Saskatchewan’s odds of in-migration, whereas 
                                                 
13 In 1995, Quebec’s share of Canada’s total employment was 24%, compared with Alberta’s 10%. 
14 We learned about this coding problem from the staff of Statistics Canada after we became 
suspicious about the net gains of some categories of relocating immigrants by the Atlantic region 
that we had computed from the Statistics Canada’s tabulations. The coding problem occurred, 
because for a person who failed to indicate in her/his tax return the province of residence, a code of 
0 was assigned to her/him, which was also the code for Newfoundland. Because the number of such 
individuals was very small, this problem is unlikely to result in a significant bias in the overall 
patterns of post-landing migration. So far we have not been informed by Statistics Canada whether 
a corrective measure has been taken. 
15 Let m[i] and m[j] be the in-migration rates (in percent) of provinces i and j, respectively.  The 
odds ratio of the in-migration of province i to the in-migration of province j is defined as 
(m[i]/(100-m[i]))/(m[j]/(100-m[j])).  With increasingly common use of logistic models in social 
sciences, odds ratio are now widely adopted as a measure for comparing the propensities of making 
certain choices (e.g. migration or being on welfare) between two categories of people.  More 
importantly, Otomo and Liaw (2003) have demonstrated with Japanese data that the use of the 
difference in migration rates for studying the gender difference in the education effect on migration 
leads to a misleading conclusion, whereas the use of odds ratio does not.        12
Saskatchewan’s odds of out-migration was 16.4 times Ontario’s odds of out-migration.  In other 
words, the provinces differed much more in their powers to attract migrants than in their powers to 
retain migrants.  There are two major consequences of this huge difference.  First, interprovincial 
variation in migration volume was much greater for in-migration than for out-migration. 
In-migration volume ranged from a minimum of 1,360 (for Saskatchewan) to a maximum of 50,390 
(for Ontario), whereas out-migration volume ranged from a minimum of 6,005 (for Saskatchewan) 
to a maximum of 28,590 (for Quebec).  Second, in-migration volume played a more important role 
in determining net migration volume than did out-migration volume.  For example, although it had 
the second largest out-flow of migrants, Ontario turned out to have the largest net gain of migrants 
(26,335), because it had by far the largest inflow of migrants.  Thus, in general, it was the ability to 
attract rather than the ability to retain that was the main determinant of a province’s net migration.  
3.3. Net Migration 
  With a net gain of 14,840 relocating immigrants, British Columbia was the second major net 
gainer. With a much smaller share of the immigrants at landing than that of Ontario, British 
Columbia, however, had a net migration rate (11.7%) that was twice the net migration rate of 
Ontario (5.5%), implying that the post-landing migration had a greater relative impact on British 
Columbia than on Ontario. Unexpectedly, the North region also turned out to be a net gainer by 
achieving apparently a net gain of 1,020 relocating immigrants, which implied a huge net migration 
rate of 87.9%.  Because the cell frequencies of the North region in the multidimensional tabulations 
are very small and are seriously subject to the errors created by Statistics Canada’s legally required 
rounding of the last digit of every cell frequency to either 0 or 5, the net migration volume of the 
North region is untrustworthy and hence will be ignored in the rest of this paper. 
  Alberta and all the economically weak provinces turned out to be net losers of the relocating 
immigrants. Quebec had the largest net loss of migrants (-21,000), whereas Saskatchewan had the 
most negative net migration rate (-36.0%).  Quebec’s net loss amounted to 13.0% of its newly 
landed immigrants, whereas the corresponding figures for other economically weak provinces were 
greater than 20%.  By contrast, being the only economically strong province among the net losers,   13
Alberta experienced a net loss of only 7.1% of its newly landed immigrants. 
  The net gains of relocating immigrants by Ontario and British Columbia at the expense of 
other provinces in the three years after landing had a marked effect on the interprovincial 
distribution of the immigrants in question (Panel A of Table 2).  The share of these immigrants 
increased by 2.9 percentage points (from 52.1% to 55.0%) for Ontario and by 1.6 percentage points 
(from 13.9% to 15.5%) for British Columbia. The dissimilarity index between the distribution at 
landing and the distribution three years later turned out to be 4.6%, which means that the size of the 
net transfer from the losing provinces to the gaining provinces within three years amounted to 4.6% 
of those immigrants who landed in Canada between 1980 and 1992 and filed an income tax return 
three years after landing. It is important to point out that although a dissimilarity index of 0.3 is 
“conventionally taken as the threshold for meaningful segregation” in studies of residential 
segregation of ethnic groups among very small areas such as census tracts  (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 
87), it is not reasonable to apply this threshold to the subject under investigation here, because the 
dissimilarity index is used here to measure the change in the distribution of immigrants among very 
large areas (i.e. provinces) over a very short time interval of only three years. 
  Since the decrease in Alberta’s share was relatively small (-0.7%), the post-landing 
interprovincial migration process caused the combined share of the immigrants by the 
economically weak provinces to decrease by as much as 3.9 percentage points in three years. 
  The pattern of the net transfers of the recent immigrants revealed by our analysis of the 
IMDB data turned out to be highly consistent with the pattern of the interprovincial net transfers of 
pre-1991 immigrants during the 1991-96 inter-census period (SPPR, 2001), which also showed that 
British Columbia and Ontario were net gainers, whereas the Atlantic region and all remaining 
provinces were net losers.  In light of this consistency, it is useful to investigate whether the pattern 
we have uncovered is a rather persistent phenomenon.  For this purpose, we divide the immigrants 
into two periods by the year of landing: (1) 1980-87 and (2) 1988-92.  Panels B and C of Table 2 
show that this pattern persisted through both periods. 
  An additional insight revealed by these two panels is that  from the 1980-87 landing period   14
to the 1988-92 landing period, the attractiveness of British Columbia was strengthened 
substantially, whereas that of Ontario was weakened markedly.  The net migration volume 
increased sharply from 390 to 14,450 for British Columbia and decreased substantially from 15,845 
to 10,490 for Ontario. The corresponding net migration rate increased from 0.6% to 22.4% for 
British Columbia and decreased from 7.7% to 3.9% for Ontario.
16  Underlying this dramatic change 
was the sharply strengthened job creation capacity of the economy of British Columbia and the 
substantially reduced job creation capacity of the economy of Ontario.  From the 1980-87 landing 
period to the 1988-92 landing period, the average annual employment growth rate (over all 
three-year migration intervals within each of the two landing periods) increased from 1.9% to 2.6% 
for British Columbia and decreased from 2.5% to -0.2% (negative) for Ontario.  The link between 
changes in job creation capacity and changes in the net migration of the relocating immigrants can 
also be observed for other provinces.  For the Atlantic region, the employment growth rate 
decreased from 1.8% to -0.0% (slightly below zero), while the net migration rate worsened from 
-14.7% to -33.7%.  For Quebec, the employment growth rate decreased from 1.7% to -0.0%, while 
the net migration rate worsened from -9.3% to -15.9%. For Manitoba, the employment growth rate 
decreased from 1.2% to 0.0%, while the net migration rate worsened from -16.5% to -24.9%. For 
Saskatchewan, the employment growth rate decreased from 0.8% to  
-0.1%, while the net migration rate worsened from -31.2% to -43.5%. For Alberta, the employment 
growth rate increased from 0.9% to 1.3%, while the net migration rate improved slightly from 
-7.2% to -7.0%. The correlation coefficient between the change in employment growth rate and the 
change in net migration rate turned out to be 0.71.  In short, we found evidence that the post-landing 
                                                 
16 Our finding that the net migration rate in the1980-87 landing period was much greater for Ontario 
than for British Columbia is consistent with the finding of an analysis of the 1976-81 and 1981-86 
interregional migration of immigrants (i.e. the foreign-born), based on the data of the 1981 and 
1986 census.  It was found that from 1976-81 to 1981-86, “Ontario changed from a situation of 
small losses for all groups to gains for all groups, particularly for those from Southeast Asia and 
South Asia”, whereas British Columbia’s position “deteriorated from one of consistent gains across 
the board (one to 9.4 per cent) to a mixed pattern of small gains or losses among the birth-place 
groups” (Moore, Ray and Rosenberg, 1990, p. 5).   15
migration of the immigrants within three years after landing was highly responsive to the changes 
in job creation capacities in different provinces. 
  In terms of theoretical relevance, the above findings are consistent with the ethnic enclave 
theory (Portes, 1995) in the sense that a region with large and well-established immigrant ethnic 
enclaves tends to have a strong power to retain its immigrants and also a strong power to attract 
immigrants who landed in other parts of the country.  These findings are also consistent with the 
neoclassical economic theory (Courchene, 1970) in the sense that economically strong provinces 
tend to have net gains of relocating immigrants at the expense of economically weak provinces, and 
that the magnitude and orientation of the net transfers of the relocating migrations are responsive to 
changes in the spatial pattern of new employment opportunities in a rational way. 
3.4.  Selectivity by Immigration Class 
  The three major officially-defined classes of immigrants in Canada are: (1) economic class, 
(2) family class, and (3) refugee class, representing 35%, 38% and 18% of the immigrants in our 
sample, respectively (for more details, see Appendix Table 1).
17 The three main sub-classes within 
the economic class are (i) skilled workers, (ii) business immigrants (further divided into 
entrepreneur, investor and self-employed categories), and (iii) assisted relatives.
18 Within the 
                                                 
17 In addition to these three major classes, there are a few minor classes (“post-determination 
refugee claimants”, “deferred remover orders”, “retirees”, and “permit holders applying for 
permanent residence”), representing 0.06% of all immigrants landed in 2002 (CIC, 2003). Our 
additional examination of the file of landing records (LIDS) shows that since the 1980s there has 
been a trend of increasing share of the immigrants by the economic class and decreasing share by 
the family class. For the immigrants aged 15 or over at landing, the share by the economic class 
increased from 39% in  the 1980-92 landing period to 46% in the 1993-98 landing period and  56% 
in the 1999-2001 landing period.  The corresponding share by the family class decreased from 43% 
to 39% and 31%.  It is interesting to note that instead of the family class, the economic class has 
brought in a disproportionately large share of child immigrants (those aged 0-14): 53% by the 
economic class versus 26% by the family class in the 1980-92 landing period. The corresponding 
shares in later landing periods are: 62% versus 23% in 1993-98, and 68% versus 16% in1999-2001. 
18 Within the economic class, there are also two minor categories (“live-in care givers” and 
“provincial/territorial nominees”), representing 1.79% of all immigrants landed in 2002 (CIC, 
2003).   16
economic class, skilled workers and assisted relatives are assessed mainly by their potential to 
become productive workers in Canada, whereas business immigrants are assessed by the amount of 
investment funds they can bring to Canada or by their potential to help expand employment 
opportunities in Canada. Based on the desire for family reunification, the family class includes the 
close relatives of Canadian citizens and previous immigrants.  The refugee class includes both 
refugees and asylum seekers who are accepted for humanitarian reasons.  In each immigration class, 
principal applicants are allowed to include their immediate family members (i.e. spouse or 
common-law partner, and/or dependent children) in their applications. 
  The values of the dissimilarity index in Table 3 reveal that the impacts of the post-landing 
migration on the interprovincial distribution of the newly landed immigrants differed tremendously 
among different immigration classes.  The values ranged from very low levels of 1.9% for the 
family class and 2.8% for the assisted relatives subclass to very high levels of 17.2% and 22.7% for 
the entrepreneur and investor subclasses.   
The small redistributional impact of the post-landing migration for the family class and the 
subclass of assisted relatives can be explained in the following way.  Many of the newly landed 
immigrants in these categories were sponsored or assisted by their family members or relatives who 
were mostly previous immigrants and tended to have relatively stable jobs and secure income.
19  
With their assistance, the new immigrants would have a better chance of finding a stable 
employment and adjusting to the life in their local community so that the need to make post-landing 
migration would not be great.  Even without a stable employment in the short-run, many new 
immigrants in these categories would still prefer to remain close to their well-established relatives 
for ongoing material and emotional supports. 
  Our reading of the related literature, our more detailed examination of the IMDB data, and 
                                                 
19 In order to be successful in their efforts, those who sponsor their close family members and 
relatives must be able to convince the immigration officer that they have a secure job and possess 
assets and savings large enough to support the livelihood of the new immigrants over an extended 
period of time so that the risk for the new immigrants to become the burden on the welfare system is 
minimized.      17
our observation of anecdotal but probably representative cases in our own network of acquaintances 
suggest the following likely reasons for the extremely strong redistributional effect of post-landing 
migration of entrepreneur immigrants and, especially, investor immigrants.  First, many of these 
immigrants essentially “purchased” the landed immigrant status in order to send their children to 
the relatively inexpensive education system in Canada or to establish a haven to which they could 
escape if a war or serious political disturbances were to occur in their home land (Wong, 1995; 
Tseng, 2000).  Profitable return from their investment and business success in Canada would be 
welcomed but were not their main concern.  They would use the service of any immigration agency 
to help them set up an investment arrangement or a business plan according to the official rules, as 
long as the agency was deemed trustworthy and not too expensive.  Since they were permitted to 
reside and run their business anywhere in Canada either at the time of landing (for investors) or 
about two or three years after landing (for entrepreneurs), neither the location of the immigration 
agency nor the location of the intended destination written in their application was of much concern 
to them, as long as the application had a good chance of being accepted quickly.  Second, the 
immigration agencies in some economically weak provinces, especially those in Quebec, were 
quite active in helping the applications of business class immigrants. Third, the application was less 
expensive and could be accepted faster, if the intended destination was one of the economically 
weak provinces.  Fourth, most of the entrepreneur and investor immigrants were from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and South Korea (Wong, 1995 and 2004) where they, especially the investor immigrants, 
usually had ongoing business engagements and hence had a strong preference for residing in the 
Vancouver area of British Columbia where flights back to their place of origin were less 
time-consuming.
20  In light of these probable reasons, it is not surprising that as many as 42.9% of 
                                                 
20 It is useful to note that business class immigrants were substantially less well educated than 
skilled workers.  Most of them did not have university education and were unable to understand 
English.  In order not to lose their landed immigrant status, they were required to reside in Canada 
for no less than six months each year in Canada.  In Taiwan, the term “go to sit in immigrant prison” 
was created to convey the negative image of this kind of obliged residency.  On a flight from Taipei 
to Vancouver, an investor immigrant who was on his way to endure the “immigrant prison” for a 
stretch of three months said to the first author of this paper that he deeply dislike the stay in   18
entrepreneur immigrants “landed” in economically weak provinces, compared with 24.5% of all 
classes of immigrants.  The share of entrepreneur immigrants by the economically weak provinces 
was reduced sharply to 26.4% three years after landing. With respect to investor immigrants, 
British Columbia shared as many as 47.1% of them at landing and increased its share to a hefty 
61.6% three years after landing.  It is interesting to note that Quebec’s share of investor immigrants 
decreased from 20.4% at landing to only 4.0% three years after landing.  To investor immigrants, 
Quebec appeared to be a convenient stepping stone (Xu and Liaw, 2003). Actually, our more 
detailed examination of the IMDB data revealed that most of the out-migrations of investor 
immigrants from Quebec took place by the end of the landing year, suggesting that many of them 
never physically resided in Quebec.     
  For those who are concerned with the immigrants’ burden on welfare and social services, 
the relocations of the refugee class may be of particular interest, because refugee immigrants tend to 
have higher usage of social assistance than the immigrants in other classes (Dempsey and Yu, 2004).  
We found that the interprovincial net transfer of refugee immigrants from losing to gaining  
provinces (7.6%) was much less than those of business immigrants but was greater than that of all 
classes of immigrants combined (4.6%).
21  The relatively strong propensities of refugee immigrants 
to relocate in both Canada and the United States have been mentioned frequently in the literature 
and largely attributed to the fact that refugees from overseas were not given the opportunity to 
select their initial destinations in the host country (SPPR, 2001; Bartel and Koch, 1991).  In Canada, 
government-assisted refugees were sent to the destinations selected by the government, whereas 
privately-sponsored refugees were settled in the areas where the sponsorship organizations or 
groups were located (Orr, 2004).  As a result, the initial settlement pattern of refugees has been 
                                                                                                                                                               
Vancouver, because his two children were out most of the time and he could not find any one to 
socialize.  He further said in an angry tone that if his children refuse to go back to Taiwan after 
finishing schooling in Canada, he would cut off the parent-child relationship!      
21 Mathematically, the dissimilarity index is equivalent to (1) the sum of the net migration volumes 
of all net gaining provinces divided by (2) the sum of the immigrants in all provinces.   19
more dispersed than those of other classes of immigrants (SPPR, 2001, p. 29).  Due to the lack of a 
large co-ethnic community and insufficient employment opportunities in most of the provinces of 
their initial residence, refugee immigrants tend to have relatively high propensities to relocate and 
orient themselves towards Ontario and British Columbia. 
  It is important to mention that despite the fact that although refugee immigrants were more 
prone to landing in the economically weak provinces than other classes of immigrants, they had a 
strong tendency to land in Ontario: at landing, Ontario shared as many as 54.3% of the refugee 
immigrants, compared to its share of 52.1% of all classes of immigrants.  What is particularly worth 
noting is that Ontario’s share of refugee immigrants increased markedly to 60.2% three years after 
landing, which was greater than its share of any other class of immigrants.  By contrast, British 
Columbia’s share of refugee immigrants was unusually low both at landing and three years later 
(7.9% and 9.6%, respectively).  This sharp difference between Ontario and British Columbia 
suggests that refugee sponsorship was rather inactive in British Columbia, and that refugee 
immigrants had a much stronger tendency than other classes of immigrants to be attracted by their 
co-ethnic communities, most of which were well-developed in Ontario. 
   Although the intensity of interprovincial net transfer of the immigrants varied tremendously 
among different classes of immigrants, all classes of relocating immigrants shared the same 
geographical pattern of net transfer: net gains for Ontario and British Columbia versus net losses 
for the remaining provinces.
22  We consider this remarkable consistency as a strong evidence that 
employment opportunities in the labor market and the sizes of co-ethnic communities within the 
provinces were the two most fundamental determinants of the post-landing interprovincial 
migration of the immigrants.   
  The unusually strong attraction of British Columbia to entrepreneur and especially investor 
immigrants both at landing and in post-landing relocations suggests that they continued to have a 
                                                 
22 It is likely that the apparent net gain of 35 self-employed immigrants by the Atlantic region was 
due to the coding problem mentioned before. Thus, we ignore this minor exception.   20
strong attachment to their homelands in the Far East.  However, it is worth noting that they are in 
general not similar to the Latin American “transnational entrepreneurs” in the United States who 
tend to be better educated, deeply engaged in both native and host communities, and quite 
successful in exploiting the economic complementarity between their native and host societies 
(Portes, Haller, and Guarnizo, 2002). An assessment by Ley (2000) revealed that business class 
immigrants in general had serious difficulties in carrying out their business activities in Canada and 
made very modest contribution to the creation of employment opportunities in Canada.  With rather 
modest educational qualification and inability to use either English or French effectively, most of 
the entrepreneur and investor immigrants achieved relatively low income in Canada (Wang and Lo, 
2004) and could not be expected to make significant positive contribution to the vitality of the 
economically weak provinces, even if they had not out-migrated.     
 
3.5. Selectivity by Educational Attainment 
  An important feature of the interprovincial migration of the Canadian-born has been that it 
is highly selective with respect to educational attainment so that it results in much larger net transfer 
of university graduates from the economically weak provinces to the economically strong 
provinces than those with lower educational attainment (Liaw, 1998).  For example, our analysis of 
the 1991-96 interprovincial migration of the Canadian-born young adults (aged 25-34 in 1996), 
based on the 1996 census data, shows that Saskatchewan had a net migration rate of -11.0% for 
those with at least a university degree and –2.7% for those without a university degree, and that the 
corresponding values of British Columbia were 43.6% and 8.6%, respectively.  The strong 
educational selectivity has reduced not only the quantity but also the quality of human resources of 
the economically weak provinces, which has in turn further weakened the economic vitality there.  
Through the process of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957; Higgins and Savoie, 1997), this 
selectivity has been one of the main reasons for the failure of the interprovincial migration process 
in eliminating the persistent economic disparities.  Are the new immigrants’ post-landing 
migrations similarly selective with respect to educational attainment?   21
  We found that the educational selectivity in the immigrants’ interprovincial migration 
during the three years after landing was rather weak and somewhat irregular (Table 4).  The 
dissimilarity index measuring the net impact on the interprovincial distribution of the immigrants 
was indeed greater for those with Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees (5.5%) than for those with less 
education (ranging between 3.8% for those with 0-9 years of schooling and 4.8% for those with 
10-12 years of schooling and those with trade certificates). However, the smallest dissimilarity 
index (1.8%) occurred to those with a doctoral degree.
23   An important implication of this rather 
weak and somewhat irregular educational selectivity is that unlike the corresponding migration of 
the Canadian-born, the post-landing interprovincial migration of the immigrants did not have 
much effect on the widening of the preexisting difference in the quality of human resources between 
the economically weak and strong provinces. 
  We suspect that the rather weak educational selectivity in the post-landing migration of the 
immigrants was mainly due to the “unnatural” destination choices of (1) refugee, (2) entrepreneur, 
and (3) investor immigrants at landing. We have shown in the previous section that these three 
groups of immigrants were particularly prone to making post-landing migration.  We further found 
from the file of landing records (LIDS) that these three groups of immigrants were much less 
educated than skilled workers.  In short, the educational selectivity was weakened by (1) the 
government’s omission of the spatial pattern of economic opportunities as part of the basis for 
assigning refugee immigrants to various parts of Canada and for approving the sponsorships of 
private organizations and groups, and (2) the use of some economically weak provinces by 
entrepreneur and investor immigrants as an expedient stepping stone for getting a landed 
immigrant status.  
  It is remarkable that the pattern of net gains by Ontario and British Columbia at the expense 
                                                 
23 This very low dissimilarity for those with a doctoral degree probably resulted from the possibility 
that a high proportion of them had completed their education in the United States and other 
developed countries and had obtained a job at a college or university in Canada before obtaining the 
landed immigrant status so that their propensities to make post-landing migration in Canada were 
reduced.    22
of all other provinces prevailed through all levels of education, with the minor exception of the 
Atlantic region’s slight net gain at the doctoral level, which was probably due to the coding problem 
mentioned before.  Both unskilled and skilled immigrants showed the same directionality in 
post-landing migration– both shifted from the economically weak provinces and towards only 
Ontario and British Columbia among the three economically strong provinces. It seems that Ontario 
and British Columbia offered the greatest new employment opportunities at all skill levels.  
 
4. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE INTERSTATE MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
  Before the migration information in the 2000 census became available, the general finding 
about the internal migration of the immigrants in the United States was that although the initial 
destination choices of the immigrants were highly concentrated in a few ports of entry, there has not 
been clear evidence of the spatial dispersal resulting from their internal migration, except for a few 
ethnic groups such as East Indians, Japanese and Koreans (Bartel and Koch, 1991).  The settlement 
pattern of the immigrants in the United States remained highly concentrated.  However, recent 
studies based on the data from the Current Population Surveys and the 2000 census have revealed 
that in the late 1990s, both the initial destination choices and the post-landing migrations of the 
immigrants in the United States displayed patterns of marked spatial dispersal at both state and 
metropolitan levels (Passel and Zimmermann, 2001; Fix and Passel, 2003; Frey, 2004).     
  By examining some salient features of the 1995-2000 interstate migration of the pre-1995 
immigrants of the United States, we hope to uncover some reasons for the difference between 
Canada and the United States in the redistributional trends of the relocating immigrants. 
  We see in Table 5 that among the six states with the largest immigrant populations, four 
states (California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois) had a net loss of immigrants as a 
consequence of the interstate migration in 1995-2000, whereas only two states (Texas and Florida) 
had a net gain.  The net losses of California (-243,859) and New York (-228,991) 
were so much larger than the net gains of Florida (108,357) and Texas (19,198) that there was a net 
loss of 376,376 relocating immigrants for the set of the six most populous states.  The   23
corresponding net migration rate turned out to be -1.9%.  This is a clear evidence of 
deconcentration. 
  There were many states with a net gain of the relocating immigrants.  These net gaining 
states included not only numerous states with moderate foreign-born populations but also quite a 
few states with very small foreign-born populations. Thus, we see a clear evidence of widespread 
dispersal of the relocating immigrants. 
  The major gaining states of relocating immigrants were those with attractive physical 
environments and rapid growth of employment opportunities, including Nevada and Arizona in the 
West Region, and Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina in the South Atlantic Division.  These were 
the same states that had large net gains of US-born interstate migrants.  Thus, to a large extent, the 
net migration pattern of relocating immigrants was similar to that of US-born migrants. 
  However, there was a sharp difference.  Among the 12 states in the Midwest Region, as 
many as 8 states (Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska) 
had a net gain of relocating immigrants, whereas only two states (Minnesota and Missouri) had a 
net gain of US-born migrants.  In other words, the majority of states in the “rust belt” and the 
agricultural heartland became net gainers of relocating immigrants, while continuing to lose 
US-born migrants in the late 1990s.  This difference between the immigrants and the US-born 
suggests that despite being the region with the weakest job-creation capacity in the late 1990s
24, the 
Midwest Region had many employers that were providing many jobs to the relocating immigrants.  
Since we also found that most of the relocating immigrants entering into these states were poorly 
educated, it is likely that most of these jobs were low-wage jobs that the US-born workers were 
probably unwilling to take (e.g. the physically demanding and risky jobs in meat packing plants 
(Gozdziak and Bump, 2004) and at construction sites as well as menial jobs in restaurants, hotels, 
supermarkets, large retail stores, and office buildings). 
                                                 
24 Based on the employment data of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.doc.gov/ bea), we 
found that the 1995-2000 employment growth rate was 8.76% for the Midwest Region, 9.24% for 
the Northeast Region, 13.16% for the South Region, and 15.90% for the West Region.    24
  In light of these salient features in the interstate migration of the immigrants in the United 
States in the late 1990s, we now try to provide two main reasons for the difference between (1) the 
further concentration of immigrants into Ontario and British Columbia via their post-landing 
migration in the 1980s and 1990s and (2) the widespread dispersal of relocating immigrants in the 
United States in the late 1990s.  First, in terms of the capacities to create employment opportunities 
and to improve productivity, the spatial economy of Canada has retained the dichotomy between 
the three economically strong provinces (Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta) and the remaining 
economically weak provinces since the 1950s (Liaw and Qi, 2004), whereas that of the United 
States  has changed markedly since the 1970s-- relative stagnation in the Northeast and Midwest 
Regions, accompanied by rapid expansion in the South and West Regions.  Thus, the relocating 
immigrants in Canada continued to gravitate towards Ontario and British Columbia, whereas the 
relocating immigrants in the United States joined the US-born individuals in shifting towards the 
booming states of South Region (e.g. Georgia and North Carolina) and West Region (e.g. Nevada, 
Arizona, and Colorado). 
  Second, although the immigrants of both Canada and the United States, relative to those 
born in the host country, were over-represented at the two extremes of educational attainment, the 
American immigrants were more heavily concentrated at the lower extreme than were Canadian 
immigrants.  In the United States, a large proportion of the poorly educated immigrants were illegal 
immigrants who had been largely confined to the low-wage jobs in a few major port-of-entry states 
until 2.7 millions of illegal immigrants were legalized after the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act was passed in 1986 (Martin, 2003).  Many legalized immigrants no longer feared the exposure 
to immigration authorities and migrated in the 1990s to many states (including both traditional 
industrial and agricultural states in the Midwest) where in addition to the availability of unskilled 
jobs, the prices of houses were lower so that they could even aspire to become home owners.
25 The 
                                                 
25 Many of the legalization of the illegal immigrants under IRCA took place in the early 1990s.  The 
dispersal effect of this transformation was reflected in the data of the Current Population Survey 
data, which revealed that “the number of immigrants settling in the forty states with the smallest 
immigrant populations rose by 50 per cent between 1990 and 1996” (Fix and Zimmerman, 2004, p.   25
importance of the interstate migration of these poorly-educated immigrants in determining the 
overall net transfer of relocating immigrants is reflected in the education selectivity in the 
1995-2000 interstate migration of immigrants.  For example, we found that for the immigrants aged 
25-59, California had a net loss of 121,836 relocating immigrants with less than high school 
education and a net gain of 18,546 relocating immigrants with a college degree.  By contrast, 
Michigan had a net gain of 5,864 relocating immigrants with less than high school education and a 
net loss of 1,294 of relocating immigrants with a college degree.  Without such a large pool of 
unskilled and recently legalized immigrants, the widespread dispersal of the poorly-educated 
immigrants has not been part of the big picture in Canada. 
 
5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS 
  We have found that newly landed immigrants in Canada were much more prone to making 
long-distance migrations soon after landing than were Canadian-born individuals and immigrants 
who had resided in Canada for five or more years.  Unfortunately, the post-landing migration of the 
immigrants did not lead to a dispersal of the immigrant population.  On the contrary, it led to a 
further concentration of the immigrant population in Ontario and British Columbia which already 
had more than their “fair” shares of immigrants at the time of landing.  This pattern of net transfer 
persisted through the 1980s and early 1990s, with a substantial increase in British Columbia’s net 
gain in the early 1990s when its employment growth accelerated.  The persistent net gains of 
Ontario and British Columbia could be attributed to the strong economies and large co-ethnic 
communities of these two provinces.  Having a major international airport further enhanced the 
attractiveness of these two provinces, especially to the immigrants who retained ongoing business 
engagements in their home countries or had no intention of residing in Canada on a long-term basis 
after obtaining Canadian citizenship. 
  Our analysis of in- and out-migration revealed that a province’s ability to achieve a net gain 
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of relocating immigrants depends much more on its ability to attract them than on its ability to 
retain them.  An important policy implication of this finding is that instead of focusing on measures 
to retain immigrants, the provinces with a net loss of immigrants should emphasize the active 
promotion of its attractive features (e.g. specific career opportunities) in other provinces. 
In line with this idea, the provincial government of Saskatchewan has occasionally advertised the 
attractive features of its province to TV viewers in Ontario since 2003.  It would be helpful if the 
advertisements were accompanied by more concrete measures such as recruitments of specific 
kinds of workers.    
  Unlike the very strong educational selectivity in the interprovincial migration of the 
Canadian-born that resulted in not only a net loss of migrants but also a decrease in the quality of 
human resources in the economically weak provinces, the educational selectivity in the 
interprovincial migration of the new immigrants within the first three years after landing turned out 
to be rather weak and somewhat irregular. Although this finding suggests that the post-landing 
migration of the immigrants was less detrimental to the economically weak provinces than was the 
interprovincial migration of the Canadian-born, it was probably only a short-term phenomenon 
resulting from the “unnatural” destination choices of the immigrants in the refugee, entrepreneur, 
and investor classes.  We expect that as the immigrants stay longer in Canada, the educational 
selectivity in the internal migration of the immigrants would become similar to that of the 
Canadian-born. 
  Can the immigration program be adjusted to reduce the post-landing net transfer of 
immigrants into Ontario and British Columbia?  Our analysis of the selectivity with respect to 
immigration class suggests that the answer is “yes, to some  extent”.  Specifically, the government 
can increase the shares of the annual intake of immigrants by the family and the assisted relatives 
classes and reduce the shares of it by the refugee and business classes.  But, it is worth noting that at 
the time of landing, the immigrants of the former class and subclass were already heavily 
concentrated in Ontario and, in the case of the family class, in British Columbia.   
  Our comparison of the situations between Canada and the United States suggests that   27
without a fundamental change in the spatial economy of Canada, it is unlikely that the trend of the 
net loss of the economically weak provinces can be reversed in the foreseeable future. But, it is not 
helpful to blame the immigrants for migrating in a way that resulted in problematic consequences 
for the economically weak provinces.  The solution depends ultimately on the reduction of the wide 
economic gap between the economically strong and weak provinces. But, there are powerful forces, 
such as globalization (Sassen, 1988 and 1991) and changes in the global economy, working against 
this reduction. What has happened in recent years is the further strengthening of the economy of the 
oil-rich province of Alberta, mainly as a consequence of the rapid expansion of energy 
consumption in China. Having huge amounts of energy resources, zero provincial sales tax, and no 
public debt since 2004, Alberta is likely to change from a minor net loser to a long-term net gainer 
of relocating immigrants, as its immigrant communities become bigger and bigger in a process of 
cumulative causation.  
  Despite the problematic post-landing interprovincial migration of the immigrants, the 
Canadian government continues to emphasize the positive effects of immigration to the Canadian 
economy and society.  To further amplify these positive effects, the Minister of CIC, Joe Volpe, 
announced  in a news release on April 18, 2005 that Canada will allow international students at 
public post-secondary institutions (1) “to work off-campus while completing their studies so that 
they can experience the Canadian labour market and gain a wider understanding of Canadian 
society” and (2) “to work for two years, rather than one year, after graduation” (News Release 
2005-12, www.cic.gc.ca).  In an attempt to prevent too much concentration of immigrants, he also 
indicated in the same news release that the second initiative “will apply outside Montreal, Toronto, 
and Vancouver”.   Hopefully, our research findings would serve as useful reference materials for 




Alba, R. and V. Nee (2003) Rethinking the American Mainstream, Cambridge, Massachusetts:   28
Harvard University Press. 
APEC (2001) The Equalization Program and Atlantic Canada, Atlantic Report, winter issue, 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council. (www.apec-econ.ca)  
Beaujot, R. and D. Kerr (2004) Population Change in Canada (second edition), Don Mills, Ontario: 
Oxford University Press Canada. 
Bartel, A. P. and M. J. Koch (1991) Internal migration of U. S. immigrants, In J. M. Abowd and R. 
B. Freeman (ed.) Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, 121-134, Chicago: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
CIC (Citizenship and Immigration Canada) (2003) Facts and Figures: 2002. (www.cic.gc.ca) 
Courchene, T. J. (1970) Interprovincial migration and economic adjustment, Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 3: 550-576. 
 
Courchene, T. J. (1986) Avenues of adjustment: The transfer system and regional disparities, In D. 
J. Savoie (ed.) The Canadian Economy: A Regional Perspective, 25-62, Toronto: Methuen. 
Dempsey, C. and S. Yu (2004) Refugees to Canada: Who are they and how are they faring? 
Canadian Issues (March edition sponsored by the Metropolis Project): 5-9. 
Fix, M.and J. S. Passel (2003) U.S. Immigration– Trends & Implications for Schools, Publication 
ID#410654, The Urban Institute, Washington, D. C. (www.urban.org) 
Fix, M. and W. Zimmerman (2004) The legacy of welfare reform for U. S. immigrants, In D. S. 
Massey and J. E. Taylor (ed.) International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global 
Market, 335-351, Oxford University Press.  
Frey, W. H. (2004) Immigration, domestic migration and US metropolitan changes: Contrasting the 
1990s with the 1980s, presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of 
America, Boston. 
Gozdziak, E. M. and M. N. Bump (2004) Poultry, apples, and new immigrants in the rural   29
communities of the Shenandoah Valley: An ethnographic case study, International 
Migration, 42(1): 149-164. 
Higgins, B. and D. J. Savoie (1997) Regional Development Theories & Their Application, New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.     
Liaw, K. L. (1998) Human resources and economic development in the Atlantic Region of Canada, 
In M. Kimura and Y. Hayase (ed.) Proceeding of the International Seminar on Human 
Resources and Regional Development in the APEC Member Economies, 104-125,  Tokyo: 
Institute of Developing Economies. 
Liaw, K. L. and M. Qi (2004) Lifetime interprovincial migration in Canada: Looking beyond 
short-run fluctuations, The Canadian Geographer, 48:168-190. 
Martin, P. and E. Midgley (2003) Shaping and Reshaping America, Population Bulletin, 58 (2). 
Washington, D. C.: Population Reference Bureau. 
Moore, E. G., B. K. Ray, and M. W. Rosenberg (1990) The redistribution of immigrants in Canada, 
Population Working Paper, No. 12, Employment and Immigration Canada, Ottawa-Hull, 
K1A 0J9, Canada. 
Myrdal, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London: Gerald Duckworth & 
Co. Ltd. 
Newbold, K. B. (1996) Internal migration of the foreign-born in Canada, International Migration 
Review, 30: 728-747. 
Orr, B. (2004) Resettlement: A durable solution, Canadian Issues (March edition sponsored by the 
Metropolis Project): 22-24. 
Otomo, A. and K. L. Liaw (2003) An invitation to multivariate analysis: An example about the 
effect of educational attainment on migration propensities in Japan, SEDAP Research Paper, 
No. 113, SEDAP Research Program, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4, 
Canada. 
Passel, J. S. and W. Zimmermann (2001) Are immigrants leaving California? Settlement patterns of 
immigrants in the late 1990s, Research Report, Pub. ID#410287, The Urban Institute,   30
Washington, D.C. 
Portes, A., W. J. Haller, and L. E. Guarnizo (2002) Transnational entrepreneurs: An alternative 
form of immigrant economic adaptation, American Sociological Review, 67: 278-298. 
Sassen, S. (1988) The Mobility of Labor and Capital, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sassen, S. (1991) The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
  SPPR (Strategic Policy, Planning and Research) (2001) Towards a More Balanced Geographic 
Distribution of Immigrants, Communications Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 1L1. (www.cic.gc.ca) 
Statistics Canada (1988) Canada Year Book, 1988, Hull, Quebec: Supply and Services Canada. 
Statistics Canada (1999) Canada Year Book, 1999, Hull, Quebec: Supply and Services Canada. 
Statistics Canada (2002) Income in Canada, 2000. (http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/ 
Collection-R/Statcan/75-202-XIE.html) 
Tseng, Y. F. (2000) The mobility of entrepreneurs and capital: Taiwanese capital-linked migration, 
International Migration, 38: 143-168. 
Wang, S. and L. Lo (2004) Chinese immigrants in Canada: Their changing composition and 
economic performance, CERIS Working Paper No. 30, Joint Centre of Excellence for 
Research on Immigration and Settlement, Toronto. 
Wong, L. L. (1995) Chinese Capitalist migration to Canada: a sociological interpretation and its 
effect on Canada, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 4: 465-489. 
Wong, L. L. (2004) Taiwanese immigrant entrepreneurs in Canada and transnational social space, 
International Migration, 42: 113-152. 
Xu, L. and K. L. Liaw (2003) Explanation of initial destination choices of skilled immigrants from 
Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan to Canada: 1983-1999, Journal of Population Studies, 26: 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   32
Table 2.  The Interprovincial Migration of the Immigrants in a three-year period after landing in Canada: from 1980-83 to 1992-95.











(Persons) (Persons) (Persons) ( % ) (Persons) ( % ) (Persons) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % )
Panel A ALL LANDING YEARS: from 1980 to 1992
Atlantic 15,835 12,155 2,390 15.1 6,070 38.3 -3,680 -23.2 1.7 1.3 -0.4 0.27
Quebec 161,855 140,855 7,590 4.7 28,590 17.7 -21,000 -13.0 17.7 15.4 -2.3 1.01
Ontario 477,145 503,480 50,390 10.6 24,055 5.0 26,335 5.5 52.1 55.0 2.9 11.50
Manitoba 33,925 27,080 2,105 6.2 8,950 26.4 -6,845 -20.2 3.7 3.0 -0.7 0.24
Saskatchewan 12,890 8,245 1,360 10.6 6,005 46.6 -4,645 -36.0 1.4 0.9 -0.5 0.15
Alberta 85,815 79,735 11,060 12.9 17,140 20.0 -6,080 -7.1 9.4 8.7 -0.7 1.33
B. C. 126,790 141,630 27,185 21.4 12,345 9.7 14,840 11.7 13.9 15.5 1.6 3.45
North 1,160 2,180 ---- ---- ---- ---- 1,020 87.9 0.1 0.2 0.1 ----
Total 915,380 915,380 103,155 11.3 103,155 11.3 0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 ----
Dissimilarity Index ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 4.6 ----
Panel B LANDING YEAR: up to 1987
Atlantic 8,730 7,445 1,655 19.0 2,940 33.7 -1,285 -14.7 2.1 1.8 -0.3 0.40
Quebec 71,340 64,720 3,460 4.9 10,080 14.1 -6,620 -9.3 16.9 15.3 -1.6 0.98
Ontario 204,905 220,750 24,635 12.0 8,790 4.3 15,845 7.7 48.5 52.2 3.7 11.30
Manitoba 19,085 15,935 1,225 6.4 4,375 22.9 -3,150 -16.5 4.5 3.8 -0.7 0.30
Saskatchewan 7,835 5,390 870 11.1 3,315 42.3 -2,445 -31.2 1.9 1.3 -0.6 0.21
Alberta 47,985 44,535 6,130 12.8 9,580 20.0 -3,450 -7.2 11.3 10.5 -0.8 1.64
B. C. 62,320 62,710 7,715 12.4 7,325 11.8 390 0.6 14.7 14.8 0.1 2.14
North 715 1,390 ---- ---- ---- ---- 675 94.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 ----
Total 422,895 422,895 46,405 11.0 46,405 11.0 0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 ----
Dissimilarity Index ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 4.0 ----
Panel C LANDING YEAR: since 1988 
Atlantic 7,105 4,710 735 10.3 3,130 44.1 -2,395 -33.7 1.4 1.0 -0.5 0.15
Quebec 90,515 76,135 4,130 4.6 18,510 20.4 -14,380 -15.9 18.4 15.5 -2.9 1.03
Ontario 272,240 282,730 25,755 9.5 15,265 5.6 10,490 3.9 55.3 57.4 2.1 11.69
Manitoba 14,840 11,145 880 5.9 4,575 30.8 -3,695 -24.9 3.0 2.3 -0.8 0.18
Saskatchewan 5,055 2,855 490 9.7 2,690 53.2 -2,200 -43.5 1.0 0.6 -0.4 0.10
Alberta 37,830 35,200 4,930 13.0 7,560 20.0 -2,630 -7.0 7.7 7.1 -0.5 1.08
B. C. 64,470 78,920 19,470 30.2 5,020 7.8 14,450 22.4 13.1 16.0 2.9 4.55
North 445 790 ---- ---- ---- ---- 345 77.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 ----
Total 492,485 492,485 56,750 11.5 56,750 11.5 0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 ----
Dissimilarity Index ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 5.1 ----
Note:  The immigrants included in this study are restricted to those aged 15 or over in the original income tax data file.    33
Table 3. The Interprovincial Migration of Different Classes of Immigrants in a Three-year Period 












Atlantic -375 -95 35 -50 -155 -160 -625 -1,875
Quebec -2,420 -1,795 -380 -465 -2,300 -190 -5,685 -3,950
Ontario 3,930 1,275 225 210 2,100 685 4,690 9,725
Manitoba -1,635 -105 -35 -35 -665 -335 -815 -3,010
Saskatchewan -650 -120 -10 -50 -395 -190 -660 -2,420
Alberta -1,690 -85 -30 -65 -1,010 -235 -1,010 -1,360
B. C. 2,450 935 200 410 2,115 415 3,960 2,765
Atlantic -7.7 -30.2 13.0 -90.9 -6.7 -34.0 -25.6 -56.7
Quebec -5.4 -37.7 -17.8 -80.2 -9.5 -4.1 -22.2 -14.7
Ontario 2.1 35.7 8.1 31.1 5.0 3.0 8.0 10.8
Manitoba -11.8 -46.7 -8.6 -77.8 -24.1 -19.0 -22.0 -31.4
Saskatchewan -18.2 -61.5 -11.8 -90.9 -28.3 -36.2 -39.3 -51.2
Alberta -5.0 -12.4 -5.7 -48.1 -9.8 -5.5 -9.0 -7.4
B. C. 4.2 30.4 14.4 30.6 20.1 8.1 22.2 21.2
Atlantic 1.4 2.5 3.6 1.9 2.5 1.2 2.0 2.0
Quebec 13.1 37.1 28.1 20.4 25.9 11.5 21.1 16.2
Ontario 53.7 27.8 36.7 23.7 45.1 57.8 48.4 54.3
Manitoba 4.0 1.8 5.3 1.6 2.9 4.4 3.1 5.8
Saskatchewan 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.4 2.9
Alberta 9.8 5.3 6.9 4.7 10.9 10.8 9.3 11.0
B. C. 17.0 24.0 18.2 47.1 11.2 13.0 14.8 7.9
Atlantic 1.3 1.7 4.0 0.2 2.3 0.8 1.5 0.9
Quebec 12.4 23.2 23.1 4.0 23.5 11.1 16.5 13.8
Ontario 54.9 37.9 39.7 31.2 47.5 59.6 52.3 60.2
Manitoba 3.6 0.9 4.9 0.4 2.2 3.6 2.4 4.0
Saskatchewan 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.2 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.4
Alberta 9.3 4.7 6.5 2.5 9.9 10.2 8.5 10.2
B. C. 17.7 31.3 20.9 61.6 13.5 14.0 18.0 9.6
Dissimilarity Index (%) 1.9 17.2 6.0 22.7 4.7 2.8 7.2 7.6
Note: The overall dissimilarity index for Economic-Principal applicant is 5.2%.
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Table 4. The Interprovincial Migration of Immigrants with Different Levels of Education in a Three-year Period 
                 after Each Landing Year for the Landing Years of 1980, 1981, …, 1992.
















Atlantic -750 -670 -285 -495 -200 -500 -155 10
Quebec -2,935 -5,380 -2,095 -2,180 -1,445 -3,085 -565 -100
Ontario 4,855 5,860 2,295 2,685 1,430 3,640 735 60
Manitoba -1,260 -1,455 -565 -1,040 -415 -950 -195 -15
Saskatchewan -975 -885 -325 -700 -320 -585 -135 -10
Alberta -1,060 -1,000 -490 -905 -420 -1,250 -265 -55
B. C. 2,095 3,405 1,345 2,435 1,360 2,470 445 65
Atlantic -37.9 -22.1 -19.5 -25.5 -15.4 -18.1 -15.7 1.7
Quebec -9.0 -16.0 -13.0 -12.5 -13.6 -15.2 -13.0 -5.1
Ontario 5.2 5.7 5.6 4.5 4.1 6.3 6.7 1.6
Manitoba -17.1 -21.4 -20.7 -26.5 -21.6 -22.8 -25.2 -4.6
Saskatchewan -39.2 -38.1 -31.7 -44.2 -34.4 -32.5 -24.1 -3.3
Alberta -6.5 -5.9 -6.8 -7.9 -6.3 -10.8 -11.0 -4.7
B. C. 7.9 12.6 12.1 17.5 15.4 15.1 14.4 5.6
Atlantic 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.4 4.3 6.5
Quebec 18.1 17.4 20.0 16.0 16.4 17.6 18.7 21.2
Ontario 51.8 53.6 50.8 54.1 53.4 50.5 47.5 40.8
Manitoba 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.0 3.6 3.3 3.5
Saskatchewan 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.4 3.2
Alberta 8.9 8.8 8.9 10.5 10.2 10.0 10.4 12.5
B. C. 14.7 13.9 13.8 12.7 13.6 14.2 13.3 12.5
Atlantic 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.0 3.6 6.7
Quebec 16.4 14.6 17.5 14.0 14.2 15.0 16.4 20.2
Ontario 54.5 56.6 53.7 56.6 55.7 53.8 50.9 41.7
Manitoba 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.8 2.5 3.4
Saskatchewan 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.8 3.1
Alberta 8.4 8.3 8.3 9.7 9.6 9.0 9.4 12.0
B. C. 15.8 15.7 15.5 14.9 15.7 16.4 15.3 13.3
Dissimilarity Index (%) 3.8 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.3 5.5 5.5 1.8
Note: The immigrants included in this table are restricted to those aged 25 or over in the original income tax file.
The educational categories are pre-defined in IMDB and are mutually exclusive.
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Table  5. The Effect of the 1995-2000 Interstate Migration of the Foreign-born on the Interstate Distribution
            of Foreign-born Population (aged five and over in 2000).
State Population Size Net Migration Population Distribution Foreign-born Share
In 1995 In 2000 Volume Rate In 1995 In 2000 Change of 1995 State Pop.
(persons) (persons) (persons) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % )
A. States with Greatest Foreign-born Population:
CALIFORNIA 8,137,988 7,894,129 -243,859 -3.0 28.99 28.12 -0.87 27.1
NEW YORK 3,939,585 3,710,594 -228,991 -5.8 14.04 13.22 -0.82 22.7
TEXAS 2,459,179 2,478,377 19,198 0.8 8.76 8.83 0.07 13.7
FLORIDA 2,395,205 2,503,562 108,357 4.5 8.53 8.92 0.39 17.8
NEW JERSEY 1,377,363 1,374,420 -2,943 -0.2 4.91 4.90 -0.01 18.4
ILLINOIS 1,358,802 1,330,664 -28,138 -2.1 4.84 4.74 -0.10 12.2
Sub-total 19,668,122 19,291,746 -376,376 -1.9 70.07 68.73 -1.34 20.2
B. States with Moderate Foreign-born Population:
MASSACHUSETTS 731,064 725,632 -5,432 -0.7 2.60 2.59 -0.02 13.1
PENNSYLVANIA 528,243 529,944 1,701 0.3 1.88 1.89 0.01 4.8
WASHINGTON ST. 527,063 549,885 22,822 4.3 1.88 1.96 0.08 10.4
ARIZONA 509,729 552,926 43,197 8.5 1.82 1.97 0.15 12.3
VIRGINIA 496,520 514,663 18,143 3.7 1.77 1.83 0.06 8.1
MARYLAND 447,003 456,317 9,314 2.1 1.59 1.63 0.03 9.6
MICHIGAN 429,346 439,687 10,341 2.4 1.53 1.57 0.04 4.9
GEORGIA 403,313 467,189 63,876 15.8 1.44 1.66 0.23 5.9
CONNECTICUT 385,808 388,613 2,805 0.7 1.37 1.38 0.01 12.8
OHIO 326,292 327,163 871 0.3 1.16 1.17 0.00 3.2
NORTH CAROLINA 293,932 340,119 46,187 15.7 1.05 1.21 0.16 4.4
COLORADO 280,332 311,458 31,126 11.1 1.00 1.11 0.11 7.8
OREGON 232,013 247,180 15,167 6.5 0.83 0.88 0.05 7.9
HAWAII 218,551 204,509 -14,042 -6.4 0.78 0.73 -0.05 18.9
NEVADA 216,683 276,087 59,404 27.4 0.77 0.98 0.21 14.5
MINNESOTA 193,310 207,383 14,073 7.3 0.69 0.74 0.05 4.5
WISCONSIN 168,462 171,283 2,821 1.7 0.60 0.61 0.01 3.6
INDIANA 150,872 161,991 11,119 7.4 0.54 0.58 0.04 2.8
NEW MEXICO 139,735 138,132 -1,603 -1.1 0.50 0.49 -0.01 8.5
MISSOURI 131,398 135,108 3,710 2.8 0.47 0.48 0.01 2.7
LOUISIANA 124,359 121,277 -3,082 -2.5 0.44 0.43 -0.01 3.1
TENNESSEE 124,120 138,206 14,086 11.3 0.44 0.49 0.05 2.5
UTAH 115,692 125,544 9,852 8.5 0.41 0.45 0.04 6.3
OKLAHOMA 115,605 116,805 1,200 1.0 0.41 0.42 0.00 3.8
RHODE IS. 115,431 116,496 1,065 0.9 0.41 0.42 0.00 12.6
KANSAS 109,426 115,141 5,715 5.2 0.39 0.41 0.02 4.6
SOUTH CAROLINA 100,687 109,806 9,119 9.1 0.36 0.39 0.03 2.9
ALABAMA 89,697 90,924 1,227 1.4 0.32 0.32 0.00 2.3
IOWA 68,624 67,310 -1,314 -1.9 0.24 0.24 0.00 2.6
Washington, D.C. 67,415 58,141 -9,274 -13.8 0.24 0.21 -0.03 12.2
Sub-total 7,840,725 8,204,919 364,194 4.6 27.93 29.23 1.30 6.0
C. States with Smallest Foreign-born Population:
KENTUCKY 66,003 68,790 2,787 4.2 0.24 0.25 0.01 1.9
IDAHO 58,379 59,268 889 1.5 0.21 0.21 0.00 5.3
ARKANSAS 58,360 64,405 6,045 10.4 0.21 0.23 0.02 2.5
NEBRASKA 53,938 59,420 5,482 10.2 0.19 0.21 0.02 3.6
NEW HAMPSHIRE 50,692 51,036 344 0.7 0.18 0.18 0.00 4.7
DELAWARE 42,750 45,254 2,504 5.9 0.15 0.16 0.01 6.4
MAINE 41,410 40,927 -483 -1.2 0.15 0.15 0.00 3.6
ALASKA 40,975 40,116 -859 -2.1 0.15 0.14 0.00 7.1
MISSISSIP 39,509 39,763 254 0.6 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.6
WEST VIRGINIA 23,921 22,311 -1,610 -6.7 0.09 0.08 -0.01 1.5
VERMONT 21,598 21,744 146 0.7 0.08 0.08 0.00 4.0
MONTANA 19,441 19,896 455 2.3 0.07 0.07 0.00 2.4
NORTH DAKOTA 15,104 12,749 -2,355 -15.6 0.05 0.05 -0.01 2.5
WYOMING 14,359 13,254 -1,105 -7.7 0.05 0.05 0.00 3.1
SOUTH DAKOTA 13,257 12,945 -312 -2.4 0.05 0.05 0.00 1.9
Sub-total 559,696 571,878 12,182 2.2 1.99 2.04 0.04 2.9
United States 28,068,543 28,068,543 0 0.0 100.00 100.00 0.00 11.4
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